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1 Introduction
The German unemployment compensation system comprises three elements: unemploy-
ment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), and wel-
fare payments (Sozialhilfe). In this paper, two important features of the German unem-
ployment compensation system are highlighted: the benet level and the asset-based means
test. The eects of unemployment compensation on the wealth distribution are studied in
a 60-period OLG general equilibrium model calibrated with regard to the characteristics
of the West German economy. Unemployment compensation is nanced by a proportional
payroll tax. We nd that German unemployment compensation reduces both aggregate
savings and the equality of the wealth distribution. Importantly, optimal unemployment
assistance payments are considerably lower than optimal unemployment insurance pay-
ments so that optimal unemployment compensation declines over time. In addition, asset
limits imposed on the unemployed agents' allowable wealth in order to be entitled to un-
employment compensation are shown to be harmful if the wealth limit is chosen below the
average wealth in the economy.
The economy we study has three features that are crucial for evaluating the eect
of unemployment compensation on the wealth distribution: i) individuals are subject to
earnings uncertainty during their working life. Furthermore, insurance markets are incom-
plete. ii) Agents cannot borrow against anticipated future wages implying nonnegative
net worth at all times and all ages. iii) The provision of unemployment assistance and
welfare payments is subject to an asset-based means test. As a consequence, savings
in our economy are dierent from the ones in the traditional life-cycle model as studied
by e.g. Auerbach/Kotliko (1987). Various theoretical studies such as Dreze/Modigliani
(1972), Miller (1976), or Sandmo (1970) to name but a few show that savings increase
with the level of labor-income uncertainty whenever preferences are described by a sepa-
rable utility function with convex marginal utility. Caballero (1991) demonstrates that a
large part of wealth accumulation (up to 60%) can be explained by the presence of earn-
ings uncertainty.1 Borrowing constraints further increase aggregate wealth because they
are most likely to bind for young agents eectively shifting consumption to later years in
1Other studies on the quantitative importance of precautionary savings include theoretical work by
Skinner (1988), Hubbard et al. (1994), and Aiyagari (1994) and empirical work by Dardoni (1991). Carroll
and Samwick (1995) provide a critical review of this literature.
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life (see e.g. Hubbard/Judd, 1987, and Aiyagari, 1994). The provision of unemployment
compensation, however, reduces precautionary savings and alleviates liquidity constraints.
Furthermore, and central to the question raised in this paper, the net eect of the provi-
sion of unemployment compensation on the distribution of wealth is not straightforward:
on the one hand, unemployment compensation redistributes wealth from the rich to the
poor.2 On the other hand, precautionary savings and savings due to liquidity constraints
are likely to be reduced in a higher proportion among the poor than among the rich. The
net eect can only be studied numerically in a parameterized general equilibrium model.
In order to focus on how changes in social security aect capital accumulation through
its eect on precautionary savings, we treat employment as exogenous. A number of
authors have addressed the eects of unemployment compensation in a life-cycle model with
heterogenous agents and endogenous employment. These studies present an alternative
modelling choice complementary to ours. In Hansen and _Imrohoroglu (1992), agents are
oered a job with a certain probability. Agents value leisure and the agent can either accept
or reject the employment oer. If an agent rejects the oer and gets detected, he does not
receive unemployment insurance. Both the unemployed worker who has not received a job
oer and the unemployed worker who has refused the job oer but is not detected receive
unemployment compensation by the government. Unemployment insurance is nanced by
a tax on income. Hansen and _Imrohoroglu nd that the optimal replacement ratio is very
sensitive with regard to the moral hazard level. If the probability of an agent to reject an
employment oer undetected and to receive unemployment insurance is zero, the optimal
replacement ratio is as high as 65% for the US calibration. In the presence of moral hazard,
however, the economy can be worse o with an unemployment insurance. Costain (1997)
analyzes the eects of unemployment insurance on welfare and employment in a general
equilibrium model with search unemployment. Following an increase in unemployment
insurance benets, agents increase their reservation wage and rms reduce their posting
of vacancies. As a consequence, employment falls with rising unemployment insurance.
Costain nds that UI payments only have a small impact on welfare, on the order of
0.1% of the baseline average consumption. Optimal replacement ratios of unemployment
insurance are shown to be sensitive with regard to the degree of risk aversion.
Hubbard et al. (1995) study the eects of social insurance on precautionary savings in
2In this paper, when we talk about the rich, we refer to the wealth-rich.
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a life-cycle model with uncertain earnings. The provision of government transfers is subject
to an asset-based means test. In addition, agents dier with regard to their education.
Hubbard et al. demonstrate that social insurance depresses savings for two reasons. First,
earnings uncertainty and hence the need for precautionary savings is reduced. And second,
the means test provides a penalty on saving behavior, placing an implicit tax rate of 100
percent above the allowable wealth level for social security recipients. Furthermore, even
the prospect of unemployment inuences the savings behavior. For intermediate levels of
wealth, households may switch from a policy of consuming all income to one with increased
savings. Within this range of wealth, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth
can fall below zero. Hubbard et al. show that their life-cycle model with a social insurance
program subject to an asset-based means test is able to replicate empirical wealth-age
patterns.
Our model is most closely related to Hubbard et al. (1995). In accordance with
them, we study a life-cycle model with heterogenous agents and borrowing constraints.
Our model diers from the one of Hubbard et al. in two important ways: i) we study a
general equilibrium. As a consequence, both the wage rate and the interest rate depend on
accumulated wealth in our economy. Furthermore, we demand the government budget to
balance at any time and additional expenditures on unemployment compensation are to be
nanced by an increase of the labor income tax rate. ii) The unemployment compensation
system in our model is adapted to the German institutional characteristics, i.e. we dis-
tinguish unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, and welfare payments, the
latter two being subject to an asset-based means test. Hubbard et al., instead, assume
that the government guarantees a minimum level of consumption. In addition to Hubbard
(1995), we analyze the eects of a change in the asset limit.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the unem-
ployment compensation system in Germany. Section 3 introduces the model. In section 4,
the model is calibrated with regard to characteristics of the German economy. In section
5, our numerical results are presented. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Unemployment Compensation in Germany
Three forms of jobless pay can be distinguished in Germany: (i) unemployment insur-
ance (Arbeitslosengeld, henceforth ALG), (ii) unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe,
henceforth ALH), and (iii) welfare payments (Sozialhilfe, henceforth SH). A concise de-
scription of the former two can be found in Hunt (1995) or Steiner (1997). The latter
one is often missing from quantitative economic analyses, even though it is important
in economic terms. In fact, the number of SH recipients has exceeded the one of ALG
and ALH recipients for most of the past 20 years (source: Statististical Yearbook of the
German Statistical OÆce, various issues); e.g. in 1995, 1.78 million people received ALG,
0.98 million people ALH, and 2.55 million people SH (where 55.4% of the SH recipients
are aged between 18-65). In this section, only the features of the German unemployment
insurance system with relevance to our model in the following section are presented and
one necessary simplifying assumption of our model is pointed out.
(i) Unemployed workers receive unemployment insurance (ALG) if they have been
employed for at least 12 months during the last 3 years. Unemployed agents receive a
maximum of 67% of the previous net monthly wage for a period up to 1 year. Agents
exceeding age 42 may receive longer benets up to 3 years. Steiner (1997) and Hunt (1995)
apply values of about 9 and 14 months for the potential entitlement period, respectively.
In accordance with these studies, we will assume that unemployment insurance is paid
for exactly one year following the unemployment spell to all agents irrespective of their
employment history.
(ii) Unemployed workers receive unemployment assistance (ALH) if they have lost
entitlement to unemployment insurance (ALG) in the previous 12 months or if they have
received unemployment assistance the year before. Unemployed agents receive a maximum
of 57% of the previous net monthly wage. ALH payments are reduced by other income,
e.g. interest income, and ALH cases are reviewed once a year and are subject to an asset-
based means test. If the agent's wealth exceeds a certain limit, he is not entitled to
ALH payments. Basically, unemployment assistance is granted without any time limit
with only a few exceptions. One of these exceptions with relevance to our model is the
loss of ALH entitlement as a consequence of the means test. According to German law
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(Arbeitsforderungsgesetz x135,1),3 agents are no longer entitled to ALH if they have not
received ALH for more than one year.4
(iii) Welfare payments are conceived to prevent people from poverty and are dis-
tributed subject to the Nachrangig-principle i.e. SH is disbursed to an unemployed agent
if and only if any other source of income has been used up before. As a consequence,
all net income is deducted from SH payments and welfare payments SH are only paid
to those workers who are neither eligible for unemployment insurance nor unemployment
assistance. In the case of our model, there are only two kinds of unemployed agents quali-
fying for welfare payments: those agents who have never found a job during their lifetime
and those who were ineligible for unemployment assistance some time in the past because
of the means test and have since then consumed their wealth. SH benets are subject to a
means test, too. The mean value of current monthly SH payments to an unemployed agent
amounts to approximately 520 DM in 1998, depending on the state (Bundesland) he/she
resides in. Furthermore, SH also provides health insurance and covers the rent.5
3 The Model
In our economy, three sectors are depicted: the household sector, the production sector,
and the government. Households live for 60 years and maximize discounted life-time utility.
They inherit no wealth and they do not leave any bequests. The sixty period life span
is intended to correspond approximately to the life span of an adult, that is, the years
between 21 and 80. Agents can either be employed or unemployed during their working
life. If unemployed, agents search for a job and the probability to nd a job depends
on their age. In old age, they recieve public pensions. Firms maximize prots. Output
3On 1.1.1998, the German job promotion law (Arbeitsforderungsgesetz) was integrated in the Sozialge-
setzbuch SGB.
4There are exemptions from this period length of one year in the present law. In particular, according
to x192,2, SGB III, the unemployed worker is entitled to ALH if he has received ALG for one day during
the last three years but has not received ALH thereafter because of the means test.
5In Germany, unemployment compensation is paid for by the federal government (Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit), while welfare is paid for by the municipal government. We neglect the vertical structure of the
German jurisdictions. Feist and Schob (1999) analyze recent reform proposals of the German welfare
payment system in the presence of vertical scal externalities.
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is produced with the help of labor and capital. The government provides unemployment
compensation which is nanced by a tax on wage income. Since we will only analyze steady-
state allocations, the time index is omitted from the variables. Time periods correspond
to years.
3.1 Households
Households live for T + TR = 60 periods. The rst T = 40 periods, agents are workers
supplying labor inelastically. At age 41, retirement is mandatory and the remaining lifetime
is set equal to TR = 20. Each generation of age t is of equal measure and the measure of
all households is normalized to one.
Agents are heterogenous with regard to their age t, their wealth k, their productivity
j;t, and their employment status . Agents are born with dierent skill levels j, and
productivity j;t depends on both the skill level j, 1  j  nj, and age t. The skill level j
is assumed to be deterministic so that agents have the same skill for the whole lifetime. In
addition, productivity is age-dependent and will follow a hump-shaped path over the life
cycle in our calibrated model. We assume that each productivity class is of equal measure.










where ct denotes the consumption of the t-year household.  and  are the coeÆcient of
relative risk aversion and the discount factor, respectively, and expectations E are taken
conditional on information at the beginning of age t. The information set of the household
includes his employment status  at age t, his capital stock k at the beginning of the period6
and his skill type j.
Furthermore, workers face a risk of unemployment, but cannot insure privately against
it. Five dierent kinds of households with employment status  2 f1; : : : ; 5g can be dis-
tinguished:  = 1) employed agents of measure n, who receive wage w per eÆciency unit
6Since capital k is the only asset held by individuals, the terms capital and wealth will henceforth be
used interchangeably.
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j;t, taxed at rate  ,  = 2) short-term unemployed agents of measure nUI , who were em-
ployed a year ago and receive unemployment insurance wUI per eÆciency unit j;t,  = 3)
long-term unemployed agents of measure nUA, who were not employed a year ago and are
entitled to unemployment assistance wUA per eÆciency unit j;t (subject to a means test),
 = 4) long-term unemployed agents of measure nW , who are not entitled to unemployment
assistance because they have not been employed before at all or because they have lost
entitlement to unemployment assistance as a result of the means test, and  = 5) retired
people of measure nR with pension payments wR;j.
Unemployment insurance wUIj;t is paid to all short-term unemployed workers irre-
spective of their wealth and their non-labor income and is proportional to the income of the
employed agent with the same age t and skill level j.7 In order to receive unemployment as-
sistance, household wealth k has to be below kmaxUA . The long-term unemployed agents who
are not entitled to unemployment assistance ( = 4) receive welfare payments wW subject
to a means test, i.e. if their wealth k is below kmaxW . Contrary to unemployment insurance
and unemployment assistance payments, welfare payments wW are lump-sum and do not
depend on previous earnings or the productivity level of the agent. Furthermore, all other
non-labor income of the household is deducted from both unemployment assistance and
welfare payments. Accordingly, the non-capital income y(k; ; j; t) of a t-year old household
with capital k, employment status , and skill level j is given by:
y(k; ; j; t) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  )wj;t  = 1
wUIj;t  = 2
max(wUAj;t   rk; 0)  = 3; k  k
max
UA
0  = 3; k > kmaxUA
max(wW   rk; 0)  = 4; k  k
max
W
0  = 4; k > kmaxW
wR;j  = 5:
(2)
Pension payments wR;j depend on the individuals life-time earnings and are proportional
7In Germany, unemployment insurance depends on the wage earned during the last period of employ-
ment. In order to keep the model tractable and economize on the number of state variables, we make the
simplifying assumption that unemployment insurance depends on the productivity during the current pe-
riod rather than the productivity during the last period of employment. The same simplifying assumption
is applied to the computation of unemployment assistance.
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Agents are born without any assets. Furthermore, agents are not allowed to borrow,
k  0. Depending on his employment status , his capital holdings k, and his skill type j,
an agent of age t receives non-capital income y(k; ; j; t) and earns interest income at rate
r:
k0 + c = (1 + r)k + y(k; ; j; t);(3)
where k0 denotes next period's capital holdings.
During his working life, an agent nds employment with probability p(t). Notice that
the probability to nd a job is a function of the age t of the unemployed agent. Employed
workers get separated from a job with probability . Let (k; ; j; t) denote the measure of


























































(k; 5; j; t) dk  nR:(9)
3.2 Government
The government uses the revenues from taxing labor in order to nance its expenditures on
unemployment insurance, gUI , unemployment assistance, gUA, welfare, gW , and pensions,
8In Germany, pensions depend on the individual's lifetime contribution to the pension system, and we
make the simplifying assumption that agents of the same skill level j have contributed equal amounts to
the pension system. Furthermore, we do not model the redistributional features of the German pension
system. For a welfare analysis of the German public pension system see Fehr (1999).
8
gR:





































y(k; 5; j; t)(k; 5; j; t) dk;(14)










(k; 1; j; t) dk:(15)
The government chooses the parameters wUI, wUA, wW , and wR together with k
max
UA
and kmaxW , while the labor income tax rate  adjusts in order to guarantee a balanced
budget.
3.3 Firms
Firms are of measure one and produce output with eective labor N and aggregate capital
K. Eective labor N is paid the wage w. Capital K is hired at rate r and depreciates
at rate Æ. Production is characterized by constant returns to scale and assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas:
F (K;N) = A0K
N1 :(16)















The concept of equilbrium used in this paper uses a recursive representation of the con-
sumer's problem following Stokey et al. (1989). Let V (k; ; j; t) be the value of the objective
function of a t-year old agent of skill type j with beginning-of-period asset holdings k and
employment status . V (k; ; j; t) is dened as the solution to the dynamic program:





+ E fV (k0; 0; j; t + 1)g
#
;(19)
subject to the budget constraint (3). E denotes the expectation operator conditional on
information at the beginning of age t, and 0 is the next-period employment status.
Denition
A steady state for a given set of government policy parameters





W g is a collection of value functions V (k; ; j; t), individual
policy rules c(k; ; j; t), k0(k; ; j; t), age-dependent, time-invariant measures of agent types
(k; ; j; t) for each generation of age t = 1; 2; : : : ; T + TR, relative prices of labor and
capital fw; rg, such that:












(k; ; j; t)  k dk(20)
2. Relative prices fw; rg solve the rm's optimization problem by satisfying (17) and
(18).
3. Given relative prices fw; rg and the government unemployment compensation policy

, the individual policy rules c(:) and k0(:) solve the consumer's dynamic program
(19).












c(k; ; j; t)(k; ; j; t) dk + ÆK:(21)
5. Let B be a subset of the domain of k and I(B; k; ; j; t) be an indicator function
that takes the value one if k0(k; ; j; t) 2 B and zero otherwise. The collection of
age-dependent, time-invariant measures (B; ; j; t) satises the following transition
equations for
10
{ the measure of the employed workers in t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g:











I(B; k; ; j; t)(k; ; j; t) dk;(22)
{ the measure of unemployment insurance recipients in t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g:




I(B; k; 1; j; t)(k; 1; j; t) dk;(23)
{ the measure of unemployment assistance recipients in t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g:









I(B; k; 3; j; t)(k; 3; j; t) dk;(24)
{ the measure of welfare payment recipients in t 2 f1; : : : ; T   1g:










I(B; k; 4; j; t)(k; 4; j; t) dk;(25)
{ and the measure of retired agents in t 2 fT + 1; : : : ; T + TR   1g:




I(B; k; 5; j; t)(k; 5; j; t) dk:(26)
The distribution of the new-born generation and the rst-year retired are given by:












 = 4; k = 0
0 else
(27)






I(B; k; ; j; T )(k; ; j; T ) dk:(28)
In particular, the measures (:) are time invariant so that the current measure
(B; ; j; t) is equal to the next-period measure 0(B; ; j; t) for every subset B of
the domain of k , and every , j, and t.
6. The government budget (10) is balanced.
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3.5 Measures of Distribution and Welfare
In section 5, we compare alternative unemployment compensation schemes quantifying the
eects on distribution and welfare. The equality of wealth distribution is measured by the
gini coeÆcient.9 Our measure of welfare for given policy arrangement 
 is the expected







(0; ; j; 1)V (0; ; j; 1):(29)
As our reference economy, we take an economy with full unemployment insurance and
no means test. For such an economy, it is straightforward to compute the consumption
stream of the dierent skill types j, f~cjtg
T+TR
t=1 of the newborn generation and hence welfare
~W in this economy as each t-year old agent in every skill class j behaves identically. The
change in welfare resulting from an unemployment compensation program 
 is measured
by the consumption equivalent increase Æc such that W (
) is equal to the welfare implied




t=1 for the skill types j = 1; : : : ; nj.
One word of caution is warranted at this point. In our steady-state welfare compar-
isons, we neglect any welfare eects on the dierent cohorts during the transition from the
old to the new steady state. For example, a lower unemployment compensation is likely to
increase precautionary savings, and the capital intensity and production will be higher in
the new steady state. After a once-and-for-all reduction of unemployment compensation
payments, the capital intensity and the wage slowly increase to their new steady-state val-
ues. As a consequence, retired agents' pensions also increase during the transition, while
the interest income on their accumulated savings falls. Accordingly, the cohort welfare
during the transition may be markedly dierent from the one in the new steady state and
some generations may gain, while others may loose during the transition to the new steady
state.10
9As an alternative measure, we also provide the coeÆent of variation which is more sensitive to the
tails of the distribution, in particular the longer upper tail of the wealth distribution.
10As one of the early studies that explicitly considers the transition between steady states in a life-cycle
model, Auerbach et al. (1983) analyze the eects of a sudden once-and-for-all change in the consumption
and wage tax rate on the intergenerational redistribution. They demonstrate that the welfare gains and
losses of younger, older, and unborn generations dier substantially for the individual tax regimes.
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4 Calibration
The steady state distribution of wealth and employment and the eects of a change in the
unemployment compensation system on welfare and distribution cannot be studied ana-
lytically but only numerically. For this reason, the model is calibrated in order to match
characteristics of the West German economy.11 The time series data refer to the period
1993-94. The annual data on the unemployment rate, the number of unemployed males
and females, ALG, ALH, and SH benets are taken from the yearbooks of the German Sta-
tistical OÆce (Statistisches Bundesamt). The data on the means-tests of the ALH and SH
benets are provided by the German Federal Health Department (Bundesgesundheitsmin-
isterium). The data on the capital-output ratio is taken from Statistisches Bundesamt,
Fachserie 18.
Households
Empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1= vary considerably.
The most widely used approach to estimate 1= is based on the household's rst-order
condition of her/his intertemporal optimization calculus. While Campbell/Mankiw (1989)
nd rather small values of 1= below 0.1, Beaudry/van Wincoop (1996) nd values in
the range 0.25-0.4. Attansio/Weber (1993,1995) apply US household data rather than
US aggregate data and estimate values of 1= in the range between 0.33 and 0.66. For
German aggregate data, Flaig (1988) estimates values between 0.4 and 0.75. In accordance
with the latter studies, we will assume a coeÆcient of relative risk aversion  = 2 in our
benchmark case.12 The discount factor  is calibrated with the help of observations on the
capital-output ratio. In the years 1991-97, the ratio of the capital stock to annual GDP
was equal to 5.0 (2.6) in Germany for the total economy (producing sector). Targeting a
capital-output ratio of approximately K=A0K
N1  = 4, the household's discount factor
11The focus on West Germany rather than the whole Germany is caused by the facts that i) empirical
results for specic labor market parameters of this model and for the wealth distribution are only available
for West Germany, and ii) the East German economy is not close to a steady state in the calibration
period 1993-94; e.g. Biewen (2000) shows that the income inequality has changed in East Germany during
1990-96 but not in West Germany.
12All our qualitative results are insensitive with regard to the choice of the parameters  2 f1; 2; 4g and
 2 f0:97; 0:99; 1:01g.
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lowest quintile, j = 1 0.327 0.045 -0.00072
second quintile, j = 2 0.362 0.046 -0.00073
third quintile, j = 3 0.442 0.049 -0.00075
fourth quintile, j = 4 0.596 0.052 -0.00078
top quintile, j = 5 0.805 0.062 -0.00089
is set equal to  = 0:99. In our benchmark economy, the capital-output ratio amounts to
4.02 with a corresponding real interest rate equal to 4.64%.
With regard to the calibration of the productivity j;t, we distinguish nj = 5 skill
classes of the households. The productivity prole of the nj lifetime income classes is taken
from Fehr (1999) and normalized so that the average eÆciency in the economy is equal to
one.13 In particular, the log of the eÆciency index j;t is specied as a quadratic function









t2 . Table 1 summarizes the choice of the parameters 
j
i , i = 0; 1; 2,
j = 1; : : : ; 5.
Government
The government provides unemployment compensation. Previous estimates of West Ger-
man replacement ratios, henceforth dened as the ratio of net benets received in unem-
ployment to net earnings received at work, vary considerably. Replacement ratios com-
puted by the OECD (1996) are sensitive with regard to the household composition. In
1994, couples with no children received 60% of benets relative to their net earnings in
the rst month of unemployment, while couples with two children and housing benets
received even 88% of net earnings (for the average production worker). After 5 years of
unemployment, these numbers drop to 37% and 71%, respectively. According to a Centre
d'Etude des Revenus et des Coûts (CERC) study of European unemployment programs
cited by Burtless (1987), replacement ratios drop from 66% to 56% from the rst to the
second year of unemployment for the agent who earned the average wage. For the agents
13Fehr (1999) shows that this calibration of the income process is able to replicate the German net labor
income distribution very accurately.
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who earned twice the average wage, these numbers fall to 51% and 44%, respectively.14
Steiner (1997) computes the replacement ratio with respect to expected net wage yielding a
mean value of 0.5 for those receiving ALG between 1983 and 1994. In accordance with the
latter two studies, the replacement ratio of ALG and ALH are set equal to 50% and 44% in
the benchmark case, respectively, but a sensitivity analysis of wUI and wUA is performed
in section 5 as well. Welfare payments are computed from the ratio of average current SH
expenditures, multiplied by a factor of 1.5 in order to correct for rent and health insurance
payments provided by the local government, to net average income of a production worker.
The SH replacement ratio is set equal to 30% of the average wage in the lowest income
quintile, w1.
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As emphasized in section 2, unemployment assistance (ALH) and welfare payments
(SH) are subject to a means test (Bedurftigkeitsprufung). In 1997, ALH benets are reduced
or cancelled if household wealth exceeds 8,000 DM, which is less than the 3-month net
income of the average industrial worker in Germany. Similarly, a couple with 3 children
may own 5,200 DM in order to be entitled to maximum SH payments. However, certain
forms of assets are exempted from the means tests, e.g. inherited personal belongings, a
car (if it is necessary to drive your children to the kindergarten, for example), estate or
privately-owned houses (up to a certain value ranging from 400,000 DM to 700,000 DM
depending on the location).16 In a rst approximation, the maximum wealth levels kmaxW
and kmaxUA are calibrated to be one times and 8000/5200=1.54 times the average annual net
wage in the economy, respectively. In addition, a sensitivity analysis with regard to these
two parameters is performed.
The replacement ratio of public pension payments relative to net average earnings of
each income class over the life cycle is set equal to 50%. This value is in line with previous
studies from Fehr (1997) and Chauveau/Lour (1997). Fehr (1997) studies the tax and
pension reforms proposed in 1997 and assumes that pensions are approximately 70% of
14At the time of the CERC study, the maximum benet of unemployment insurance and unemployment
assistance amounted to 68% and 58% of net earnings, respectively.
15Almost the same number results from a computation using average expenditures of local governments
for welfare payments relative to average expenditures of the federal government for unemployment insur-
ance, after correcting the former for payments to disabled people (health risk is not considered in our
model).
16To the best of our knowledge, there is no data on the wealth of German unemployment assistance and
welfare recipients.
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average net income and are further taxed at the rate of 40%, while Chauveau/Lour (1997)
take a value of 0.55 for the pension replacement ratio in Germany for the time period 1985-
89. The income tax  is calculated from the government budget (10). The calibration of
the model's parameters is summarized in table 2.
Production
The production parameters are taken from Heer/Linnemann (1998). The production elas-
ticity of capital is set equal to  = 0:35. A0 is normalized to one. The annual depreciation
in Germany amounts to Æ = 0:04.
Labor Market
Unemployed workers have dierent probabilities to nd a job depending on their age t.
The probabilities are taken from Steiner (1997) who provides estimates of the survival
rates of males and females in 1993 through 1994 for dierent ages. Steiner uses data from
the Socio-Economic Panel for West Germany (GSOEP). The probabilities presented in
table 2 are averages of the survival rates provided by Steiner, weighted by the share of
males and females among the unemployed, respectively. Notice that the probability to nd
a job declines monotonically with the age of the unemployed agent. The job separation
probability  is calibrated in order to give the West German unemployment rate during
1993-94, which is equal to 9.25%.
5 Results
Our results are described for alternative policy programs characterizing the unemployment
compensation system in Germany. First, equilibrium properties of the benchmark case
are illustrated. Second, the eects of a change in the replacement ratios of unemployment
insurance, unemployment assistance, and welfare payments on savings and distribution are
presented. And third, the eligibility criterion of the German unemployment compensation
system is analyzed.
16
Table 2: Calibration of parameter values for West Germany 1993-94
Description Function Parameter





discount factor   = 0:99
production function y = A0k
n1   = 0:35, A0 = 1
depreciation Æ Æ = 0:04
job separation rate   = 4:46%
job nding rate
age < 5 p(:) 79.1%
5  age  21 p(:) 65.7%
22  age  24 p(:) 56.4%
24  age  29 p(:) 50.2%
29  age  34 p(:) 36.1%
34  age  39 p(:) 16.5%
unemployment insurance wUI wUI=(1  )w = 50%
unemployment assistance wUA wUA=(1  )w = 44%
welfare payments wW wW=(1  )w1 = 30%
pension payments wR wR=(1  )w = 50%
asset limit
unemployment assistance kmaxUA k
max
UA = 1:54(1  )w
welfare payments kmaxW k
max
W = (1  )w
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Figure 1: Consumption policy of a 20-year old worker
5.1 Equilibrium Properties
In this section, we discuss the properties of the benchmark equilibrium. The optimal
consumption policy of the agents and the wealth distribution are described in turn. The
consumption policies of 20-year old workers with productivity j = 2 are illustrated in gure
1.17 For the employed worker (upper dashed line), consumption is an increasing function
of wealth. For unemployed workers, however, consumption has a peak and the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth is even declining over an intermediate range of wealth.
In order to pass the means test of unemployment assistance in the following year, short-
term unemployed agents with employment status  = 2 ( = 3) increase their consumption
drastically at a wealth level of approximately k = 1:9 (k = 1:8). For this kind of policy,
agents choose a next-period capital stock k0(k; ; j; t) below kmaxUA . Similarly, agents entitled
to unemployment assistance in the present period,  = 3, and the unemployed agent who is
not entitled to unemployment insurance or assistance,  = 4, have a peak in consumption
at the wealth level k = 1:0 and k = 1:8, respectively, ensuring a next-period wealth level
below the allowable one kmaxW specied in the means test of welfare payments. Notice
17The consumption policy of the workers with dierent age t and productivity class j is qualitatively
the same as the one displayed in gure 1.
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further that consumption of unemployed agents ( = 2; 3) increases sharply for low levels
of wealth as agents are liquidity-constrained.
Average consumption of all agents amounts to 1.075 units of the consumption-
investment good and is an increasing function of age (not illustrated). The consumption-
age prole diers from the one in _Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), who nd a hump-shaped
consumption path in their life-cycle economy with liquidity constraints. _Imrohoroglu et
al. study the eects of a change in the public pensions on economic welfare and, similar to
our model, the subjective discount rate of the households is smaller than the interest rate
in the economy. However, contrary to our model, _Imrohoroglu et al. assume lifetime to be
uncertain. For this reason, preferences for consumption decline in old age in their model.18
A hump-shaped consumption-age prole is more realistic.19 In our model, however, high
old-age consumption increases the incentives to save for retirement and increases the capi-
tal stock; a similar eect would be present if we modeled the need to save for precautionary
savings (e.g. for uncertain medical expenditures) or for leaving bequests.
Average wealth amounts to K = 5:204. The age-wealth prole is hump-shaped, as
typically found in life-cycle models. During the working life of agents, average wealth of
each generation increases before it declines after retirement. The distribution of wealth
is illustrated by the Lorenz curve in gure 2. In our model, the richest 10 percent of the
agents own 30 percent of all wealth, while the poorest 30% own only 4% of the assets.
The distribution of wealth is more equal than the one observed empirically in the German
economy; in our model, the Gini coeÆcient is equal to 49.5% and falls short of values close
to 59%-89% as reported by Bomsdorf (1989).20 There are two important reasons why our
model underestimates the degree of asset dispersion: rst, we neglect self-employment and
business ownership;21 second, agents do not leave bequests.22
18In other life cycle models similar to ours, consumption is also an increasing function of age as e.g. in
Auerbach et al. (1983).
19See, e.g., Hubbard et al., 1995, for empirical evidence in the US.
20Bomsdorf analyzes Gini coeÆcients of the wealth distribution for dierent kinds of assets in the periods
1973, 1978, and 1983. Within each asset group, Gini coeÆcients are remarkably stable. The distribution
of savings, securities, and real estate in 1983 are characterized by Gini coeÆcients equal to 0.59, 0.89, and
0.74, respectively.
21Quadrini (1999) introduces entrepreneurship in a dynamic general equilibrium and presents a promising
approach in order to explain observed wealth heterogeneity among the very rich agents.
22Hubbard/Judd (1987) and Heer (2001) also consider bequests in their analysis of a life-cycle model.
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Figure 2: Lorenz curve for benchmark case
In our benchmark economy, the unemployment rate amounts to 9.22%; 3.94% of the
workforce are unemployment insurance recipients, 2.21% are entitled to unemployment
assistance, while the number of welfare recipients amounts to 3.06%. In 1995, the ratio
of unemployment insurance recipients relative to unemployment assistance recipients was
only slightly higher in West Germany and amounted to 0.82. Furthermore, the number
of welfare recipients aged 18-65 relative to the number of unemployment compensation
recipients amounted to 0.51 in Germany, while the equivalent number in our model is
approximately the same, nW=(nUI + nUA) = 0:50.
For numerical welfare comparison purposes, our point of reference will be the economy
with complete earnings insurance and no means test. With full insurance, precautionary
savings decrease implying an aggregate wealth of K = 4:939. Steady-state welfare is higher
in the full-insurance reference economy compared to the one of our benchmark calibration
In Hubbard/Judd (1987), agents have an uncertain lifetime and do not have access to annuity markets.
As a consequence, they leave bequests which are assumed to be redistributed lump-sum to the 20-year old
agents. Heer (2001) explicitly accounts for a parent-child link and parents also leave voluntary bequests to
their children. Our focus of interest, however, is the eect of unemployment compensation on the wealth
distribution as originating from earnings uncertainty and the risk of unemployment. Therefore, we refrain
from introducing business ownership and bequests into our model keeping the model as simple as possible.
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for the German economy, amounting to a gain in consumption of Æc = 0:70%. Of course,
in the presence of complete earnings insurance, there is no within-generation inequality
among the workers of the same skill class. However, the between-generation inequality
exceeds the one in our benchmark economy due to the more pronounced decrease of life-
cycle savings among the income-poor workers relative to the one among the income-rich
workers. Therefore, the Gini coeÆcient (coeÆcient of variation) for the economy with
complete earnings insurance amounts to 51.05% (0.9452). In the following, the institutional
features of the German unemployment compensation system are analyzed with respect to
its abilities to provide for a more equal distribution of wealth and a higher welfare.
5.2 Optimal Replacement Ratios
In this section, a change in the benet level of unemployment insurance, unemployment
assistance, and welfare payments is analyzed. Table 3 presents our results for the unemploy-
ment insurance payments wUI. Each row in table 3 represents a dierent unemployment
compensation arrangement 
. The rst two columns give the absolute amount of unem-
ployment insurance payments per eÆciency unit j;t and the replacement ratio, respectively,
and the remaining columns contain the equilibrium values of aggregate variables, the Gini
coeÆcient, the coeÆcient of variation CV, and the consumption equivalent increase Æc as-
sociated with the policy 
. Our benchmark calibration of the German economy is given
by the replacement ratio zUI = 50% corresponding to wUI = 0:530.
As discussed in the introduction, most theoretical studies concede that social security
decreases earnings uncertainty and hence precautionary savings. Contrary to these studies,
however, we distinguish three benet kinds of unemployment compensation and consider
age-dependent probabilities of unemployed workers to have a job in the following period.
For example, an unemployed agent at working age 30 will be unemployed for another period
with probability 1   p(30) = 63:9%. Following an increase of unemployment insurance,
employed agents will decrease precautionary savings on the one hand.23 On the other
hand, short-term unemployed workers have a high probability to be unemployed next
period as well and will save a higher proportion of their income than the employed agents.
23In addition, the employed agent's net labor income decreases slightly because the income tax rate 
increases.
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Table 3: Unemployment insurance wUI , savings, and distribution
wUI UI K w  c Gini CV Æc
0.108 0.1 5.300 1.389 22.21% 1.079 48.24% 0.889 -1.22%
0.215 0.2 5.289 1.388 22.46% 1.079 48.43% 0.892 -1.07%
0.321 0.3 5.267 1.386 22.71% 1.078 48.75% 0.897 -0.97%
0.426 0.4 5.245 1.383 22.97% 1.077 48.89% 0.890 -0.81%
0.530 0.5 5.204 1.380 23.22% 1.075 49.49% 0.910 -0.70%
0.633 0.6 5.178 1.377 23.47% 1.074 49.82% 0.916 -0.61%
0.734 0.7 5.142 1.375 23.72% 1.072 50.01% 0.920 -0.51%
0.836 0.8 5.135 1.374 23.96% 1.072 50.08% 0.921 -0.42%
0.936 0.9 5.130 1.373 24.21% 1.072 50.12% 0.922 -0.35%
1.037 1.0 5.118 1.373 24.44% 1.071 50.26% 0.924 -0.30%
Hence, a redistribution of income from the employed to the unemployed agents increases
savings for the latter reason. The total eect of an increase of UI payments on aggregate
savings is negative for the German calibration for UI 2 [0:1; 1:0]; aggregate wealth K
is a decreasing function of unemployment insurance wUI.
24 The eect of unemployment
insurance payments wUI on aggregate wealth K is signicant. Following an increase of
UI benets from the present level with replacement ratio UI = 50% to one of complete
insurance, UI = 100%, aggregate wealthK falls by 1.7%. In order to nance the additional
UI payments, the government has to increase its income tax  from 23.22% to 24.44%.
The increase of unemployment insurance payments also results in a higher concen-
tration of wealth. Following an increase of the unemployment insurance replacement ratio
from 50% to 100%, the Gini coeÆcent (coeÆcient of variation) increases from 49.5% (0.910)
to 50.3% (0.924). The provision of higher unemployment compensation decreases precau-
tionary savings of the low income quintiles (j = 1; 2) by a higher percentage than those of
the higher income quintiles (j = 4; 5). Higher unemployment insurance, however, increases
steady-state welfare, as measured by (29). The consumption equivalent increase following
a policy change from zUI = 50% to zUI = 100% amounts to Æc = 0:40%, and complete
24This result depends crucially on the assumption of a hump-shaped age-earnings prole. For a at




= 0, wealth is even an increasing function of unemployment insurance
wUI .
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Table 4: Unemployment assistance wUA, savings, and distribution
wUA UA K w  c Gini CV Æc
0.108 0.1 5.424 1.400 23.02% 1.085 47.17% 0.866 -0.58%
0.214 0.2 5.346 1.393 23.07% 1.081 48.00% 0.882 -0.55%
0.320 0.3 5.292 1.389 23.12% 1.079 48.67% 0.893 -0.66%
0.466 0.44 5.204 1.380 23.22% 1.075 49.49% 0.910 -0.70%
0.633 0.6 5.145 1.375 23.33% 1.072 49.91% 0.918 -0.77%
0.838 0.8 5.067 1.369 23.51% 1.070 50.26% 0.926 -0.84%
1.041 1.0 5.043 1.365 23.69% 1.068 50.30% 0.927 -0.93%
insurance is optimal for UI 2 [0; 1].
Table 4 summarizes the eects of unemployment assistance on the economy. In
the presence of the asset-based means test, a change in the unemployment assistance
level has an additional eect on unemployed agents' savings compared with the eects
of a change in unemployment insurance payments. For higher levels of unemployment
assistance wUA, it is optimal to dissave drastically for a wider range of wealth in order
to be eligible for unemployment assistance in the following period. As a consequence,
the eect of an increase of unemployment assistance payments wUA on the savings of the
unemployed workers is more pronounced and the decrease in the capital stock K is more
marked than in the case of the unemployment insurance benet level wUI . An increase of
UA payments from wUA = 0:466 to wUA = 1:041 with corresponding replacement ratios
of 44% and 100%, respectively, results in a reduction of the capital stock by 3.8%. In
addition, higher unemployment assistance, even though it redistributes income from the
employed to the unemployed agents, increases inequality as measured by the Gini coeÆcent
or the coeÆcient of variation. Notice that it is optimal to reduce the replacement ratio of
unemployment assistance UA to 20% for the present unemployment compensation scheme




W g. Complete insurance against long-term unemployment is not optimal
in the presence of asset-based means tests and heterogenous earnings. Quantitative welfare
eects from a change to the optimal unemployment assistance level amount to 0.15% of
total consumption.
So far, we have only studied a change of the replacement ratios UI and UA in iso-
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Table 5: Welfare payments wW , savings, and distribution
wW W K w  c Gini CV Æc
0.060 0.1 5.238 1.383 23.16% 1.076 49.37% 0.907 -4.52%
0.120 0.2 5.220 1.382 23.19% 1.075 49.46% 0.908 -2.12%
0.179 0.3 5.204 1.380 23.22% 1.075 49.49% 0.910 -0.70%
0.238 0.4 5.195 1.379 23.24% 1.075 49.50% 0.910 -0.58%
0.297 0.5 5.168 1.377 23.28% 1.074 49.57% 0.912 -0.47%
0.591 1.0 5.109 1.371 23.47% 1.072 49.70% 0.916 -0.16%
lation keeping the other parameters of the unemployment scheme xed. Varying the two
unemployment compensation replacement ratios simultaneously, the optimal unemploy-
ment compensation scheme fUI; UAg is found to be insenstive with regard to both the
assumption of asset based means tests and the level of welfare payments wW . In particular,
we nd the optimum replacement ratios to amount to (UI; UA) = (100%; 20%). This is
an important result. Full unemployment compensation is not optimal independent of the
presence of asset-based means testing, and optimal unemployment compensation is declin-
ing over time as long-term benets wUA depress savings more markedly than short-term
benets wUI.
Next consider table 5 for the analysis of welfare payments. There are four opposing
eects of welfare payments on aggregate savings: (i) precautionary savings are reduced for
all kinds of agents. (ii) Income is redistributed from the rich to the very poor. (iii) An
increase of the welfare benet level also induces a higher proportion of unemployed agents
to dissave drastically in order to pass the means test. And (iv), the liquidity constraint
is less binding, especially for the young workers who have not found a job previously.
Aggregate savings K are found to be a decreasing function of the level of welfare benets.
Interestingly, for higher welfare payments, the inequality of wealth distribution increases,
even though welfare payments redistribute income from the rich to the poor. Following
an increase in welfare benets, the asset limit kmaxW becomes a more eÆcient barrier to
the accumulation of wealth among the poor, while the reduction of precautionary savings
among the rich agents is negligible. It is welfare-improving to raise welfare payments above
the benet level wW of our benchmark case. For welfare benets wW equal to the average
net wage of the lowest skill class, (1  )w1, (corresponding to W = 1), welfare gains of
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Table 6: Asset limit kmaxUA on unemployment assistance
kmaxUA K w  c Gini CV Æc
1.0 5.211 1.381 23.18% 1.075 49.45% 0.908 -0.72%
2.12 5.204 1.380 23.22% 1.075 49.49% 0.910 -0.70%
4.0 5.140 1.374 23.38% 1.072 49.61% 0.914 -0.67%
6.0 5.135 1.374 23.40% 1.072 49.65% 0.915 -0.65%
1 5.085 1.369 23.74% 1.069 49.29% 0.909 -0.75%
0.54% of total consumption accrue.25
5.3 Asset-Based Means Tests
Asset-based means tests have two opposing eects on aggregate savings and distribution.
First, for low asset limits, redistribution of wealth is directed to the very poor. Second, asset
limits impose an implicit wealth tax of 100% on some unemployed agents. With increasing
asset limits, these agents are characterized by higher levels of wealth and the very poor
have higher incentives to save because they do not face the risk to loose entitlement to
unemployment compensation. As presented in tables 6 and 7, aggregate savings K fall
with both asset limits kmaxUA and k
max
W , while the equality of the wealth distribution, as
measured by the Gini coeÆcient and the coeÆcient of variation CV, is not a monotone
function of the asset limits. With less binding asset limits, wealth-poor unemployed agents
increase their savings and the distribution becomes more equal for asset limits kmaxUA and
kmaxUI exceeding the average wealth holding K in the economy.
The potential welfare losses from abandoning asset-based means tests on welfare
payments are negligible and amount to 0.03% of total consumption, while our results
25We do not analyze welfare payments with a replacement ratio in excess of W = 100%; we consider
the economic costs (in terms of increased unemployment, even though not modeled) of welfare payments
wW in excess of the average wage of the lowest eÆcient group, (1  )w1, to be prohibitive.
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Table 7: Asset limit kmaxW on welfare benets
kmaxW K w  c Gini CV Æc
1.0 5.203 1.380 23.15% 1.075 49.47% 0.910 -0.73%
1.38 5.204 1.380 23.17% 1.075 49.49% 0.910 -0.70%
2.0 5.191 1.379 23.23% 1.074 49.56% 0.912 -0.68%
4.0 5.167 1.377 23.25% 1.074 49.48% 0.911 -0.67%
6.0 5.154 1.375 23.27% 1.073 49.44% 0.911 -0.71%
1 5.152 1.375 23.34% 1.074 49.39% 0.909 -0.73%
suggest that it is not optimal to abandon asset-based means tests on unemployment as-
sistance. The main reason for this result is provided by the fact that, in our model,
most welfare recipients are young workers who are liquidity-constrained and have not
found a job previously; therefore, the number of unemployed workers who do not pass
the asset means test for welfare payments is small. Long-term unemployed workers en-
titled to unemployment assistance, however, are those agents who have been previously
employed and, hence, have been able to self-insure themselves against the risk of unem-
ployment by building up savings for bad times. The joint optimal unemployment scheme








W  1 is given




W g = f100%; 20%; 100%; 4:0; 5:0g. The steady-state welfare gain
from such a policy amounts to 1.07% of total consumption compared to the benchmark




W g = f50%; 44%; 30%; 2:12; 1:38g.
6 Conclusion
Our model studies the eects of the German unemployment compensation system on dis-
tribution, aggregate savings, and aggregate welfare. The following institutional features of
the German system are emphasized. First, three kinds of benets can be distinguished:
unemployment insurance payments, unemployment assistance payments, and welfare pay-
ments. Second, unemployment assistance and welfare payments are subject to an asset-
based means test. And third, the probability of being employed in the next period is lower
for unemployed workers than for employed workers and decreasing with age. Considering
these institutional features in a general equilibrium life-cycle model, our results can be
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summarized as follows. First, an increase of unemployment compensation decreases sav-
ings and aggregate wealth unanimously. Second, complete earnings insurance is optimal
for the short-term unemployed workers, but not for the long-term unemployed workers.
Third, the equality of wealth distribution is not necessarily increasing with the level of
benets. And fourth, asset-based means tests are not an appropriate instrument for the
reduction of wealth inequality, but abandonning them may result in small welfare losses.
In our model, employment is exogenous and the probabilities to nd a job and to
get separated from a job are given. The provision of unemployment insurance, however,
is likely to increase the equilibrium level of unemployment and, consequently, optimal
replacement ratios should be lower than those found in our study. For one reason, the gov-
ernment is unable to monitor the unemployed agent's behavior perfectly introducing moral
hazard into the decision of an agent to accept a job oer. This aspect of unemployment
insurance is studied by Hansen and _Imrohoroglu (1992) showing that the presence of moral
hazard results in a signicant decrease of the optimal replacement ratio of unemployment
insurance. For a second reason, the reservation wage of workers or unions increases with
the level of unemployment benets resulting in higher wages and less employment. Costain
(1997) examines a model of search unemployment with endogenous wage bargaining. In his
life-cycle model calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the US economy, equilib-
rium unemployment increases from 5.9% to 10.5% following an increase of the replacement
ratio from 13% to 78%. Since our study focuses on the eect of unemployment compensa-
tion on savings, our optimal replacement ratios should be interpreted carefully and rather
considered as an upper bound.
7 Appendix
Computation
The model has no analytical solution. Algorithms to solve heterogenous-agent model with
an endogenous distribution have only recently been introduced in the economic literature.
Notable studies in this area are Aiyagari (1994), Costain (1997), den Haan (1996), Huggett
(1993), _Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), and Rios-Rull (1996). Like most of these studies, we
will only focus on the steady state of the model. Our algorithm follows _Imrohoroglu et
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al. (1995) and Costain (1997) who also perform a numerical analysis of a life-cycle model.
The solution algorithm is described by the following steps:
1. Choose the policy parameters wUI, wUA, wW , wR, k
max
UA , and k
max
W .
2. Calculate aggregate eective employment N .
3. Make initial guesses of K and  .
4. Compute w and r from the rm's Euler equations.
5. Compute the household's decision functions by backwards induction.
6. Compute the steady-state distribution of assets and entitlement to social security.
7. Compute the values K and  , that solve the government budget and the aggregate
consistency conditions. Check whether the assets holdings are equal to the guessed
K and  . Otherwise update K and  and return to step 4.
In step 5, a simple nite-time dynamic programming problem is solved by iterating
the value function V (k; ; j; t) of a t-year old household with capital holdings k, employment
status , and skill level j. The dynamic program has four state variables: k, , j, and t. We
divide the feasible range [0; kmax] for capital k in each period into 2000 nodes. The upper
bound on capital kmax = 20 corresponds to about four times the average holding of capital
and is not binding in our numerical computations. The decision rules of generation t can
be found by a single recursion working backwards from the last period of life. In step 6,
the steady-state distribution is computed by forward iteration starting with the 1-year old
who has no wealth and given employment probability p(1). A more detailed description of
numerical details can be found in _Imrohoroglu et al. (1995).
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